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INTENT TO DECEIVE IN APPLICATIONS FOR
INSURANCE POLICIES
LEO D. BLOCH
In any type of insurance, the determination of the insurance
company to assume the risk with regard to any particular person
or thing is based on the application submitted by the person de-
siring the insurance. It is through the medium of the application
that the company secures the information which it desires with
regard to the particular risk. Logically, therefore, the insurance
company should be protected if incorrect statements are made in
the application. On the other hand, the insured is entitled to be
protected by the insurance when he has been paying premiums and
basing his conduct on the supposition that he has an effective
coverage. A court is thus faced with a conflict between these two
policies. It may resolve this difficulty by adopting any one of
three possible viewpoints it may allow the insurance company a
defense in any case where there has been a material misstatement
in the course of negotiation, or it may allow the defense only if
the applicant is in a position where he knows or should know of thp
the falsity of the statement at the time he makes it, or it may go
further and require an intent to deceive on the part of the appli-
cant.
In Washington, before 1911, the common law was applied with
regard to representations and warranties. As to the latter, the court
held that any breach of any kind, whether material or immaterial,
was sufficient to avoid the policy I In regard to representations,
the rule was that the falsity of the representation had to be mate-
rial to the risk in order to defeat the contract. It would seem that
the court required that the applicant at least be in a position
where he should have known of the falsity of his statement at the
time he made it to justify avoidance by the insurer, but made no
requirement of any showing of bad faith on his part. Thus, a lack
of ordinary care was sufficient to avoid the policy if the repre-
sentation was a material one, even though the applicant was acting
in good faith.'
* University of Washington Law School.
Hoeland v. Western Union Life Ins. Co., 58 Wash. 100, 107 Pac. 866
(1910) Miller v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 69 Wash. 529, 125 Pac.
782 (1912).
2 See note 1, supra.
3Poultry Producers' Unton v. Williams, 58 WAsh. 64, 107 Pac. 1040
(1910). See Bank of Ellensburg v. Palatine Ins. Co., 82 Wash. 55, 143
Pac. 447 (1914) (where court does not look for bad faith.)
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This rule was changed by statute in 1911, the legislature em-
dently intending to create a rule more favorable to the insured. As
modified in 1915, the statute now reads.
"No oral or written misrepresentatson or warranty made
tn the negottation of a contract or policy of insurance, by
the assured or sn his behalf shall be deemed material to
defeat or avoid the policy or prevent it attaching, unless
such mssrepresentation or warranty ss made with the in-
tent to deceive. If any breach of a warranty or condition
in any contract or policy of insurance shall occur prior to
a loss under such policy, such breach shall not avoid the
policy nor avail the insurer to avoid liability, unless such
breach shall exist at the time of such loss under such con-
tract or policy "4
The scope of this paper is limited to the italicized sentence, which
has remained unchanged since 1911. It should be noted that this
statute does not apply to marine,5 accident and health,6 and fra-
terna 7 insurance.
The court has also held that certain types of cases do not come
within the purview of this sentence. One class consists of those
cases in which no representation or promise of any type is made.
but there is stated a condition which must exist at the time the
policy is delivered for it to go into effect.8 An example of such a
condition precedent is.
"Said policy shall not take effect until the same shall be
issued and delivered by the said company and the first
premium paid in full, while my health, habits, and oc-
cupation are the same as described in this application." 9
In such conditions there is no promise by the insured, so there
is clearly no question of intent to deceive. These are simply condi-
tions that, by agreement of the parties, must exist at the time
stated for the policy to become effective. So also, no intent to de-
ceive need be found in the case of breach of a continuing war-
ranty In the case of Smith Lum. & S. Co. v. Netherlands F & L.
Ins. Co.,'0 the court clearly brings this out
"It was a promise to maintain the sprinklers after the
insurance was effected, and if it be held that the mis-
representation with respect to their existence does not
4 Rem. Rev. Stat., sec. 7078.
5 Rein. Rev. Stat., sec. 7171.
*Rem. Rev. Stat., see. 7238;, Tison v. Amertcan National Ins. Co., re-
hearing, 163 Wash. 522, 3 Pac. (2d) 998 (1931).
'Rem. Rev. Stat., sec. 7262.
"Logan v. New York Life Ins. Co., 107 Wash. 253, 181 Pac. 906 (1919).
9 Guarascto v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 110 Wash. 1, 187 Pac. 405
(1920).
10135 Wash. 547, 554, 238 Pac. 565 (1925).
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defeat or void the contract because not made with intent
to deceive, it does not follow that the failure of the in-
sured to maintain them is without consequence. Nor can
we so hold. The legislation affects the first, but not the
last, and to the last the courts are at liberty to apply the
usual and ordinary rules."
The court reaches the same result where the clause is one which
describes the risk. In Johnson v. Franklin Ins. Co.," the fire in-
surance policy involved contained a stipulation that the goods
were insured only while at the designated location and that the
policy should be void if they were moved without the insurance
company's consent. The court held that such a clause does not
come within either the first or second sentence of the statute and
is neither a warranty nor a condition but an essential part of the
contract.
In those cases in which the court finds the misrepresentation or
warranty to be made in the negotiation12 of the insurance within
the meaning of the statute the intent to deceive is an affirmative
defense to be alleged and proved by the insurance company 13 The
presence of this intent is generally a question of fact. Although
no Washington cases have been found, it would seem that the
Washington court would require that the insurance company show
that the misstatement made with intent to deceive is a material
one, on the theory that the statute was intended to lessen the in-
surance company's right to avoid.' 4 Clearly the burden of the in-
surance company is sustained if it can introduce convincing evi-
dence of a direct nature to show such intent, such as evidence of
a conspiracy between the insured and the agent to deliberately
misrepresent a material fact known to both to be material. How-
ever, it is the rare case in which this is possible.
Usually the insurance company must rely on indirect evidence.
Realizing this, the Washington court has established a rebuttable
presumption of intention to deceive where the insurance com-
pany can establish that the material representations were false to
the insured's knowledge.15 When there is a conflict in the evi-
"90 Wash. 631, 156 Pac. 567 (1916).
"2Representations and warranties made in the course of negotiation
within the meaning of the statute apparently include statements made
in the written application and also oral statements made in addition there-
to or in substitution therefor. Workman v. Royal Exch. Assurance, 96
Wash. 559, 165 Pac. 488 (1917) McCann v. Reeder et a. & Mercer Casualty
Co., 78 Wash. Dec. 111, 34 Pac. (2d) 461 (1934).
3 Brgham v. Mutual Lsfe Ins. Co., 95 Wash. 196, 163 Pac. 380 (1917)
Askey v. New York L fe Ins. Co., 102 Wash. 27, 172 Pac. 887 (1918).
"Cf. Johnson v. National Life Ins. Co., 123 Minn. 453, 144 N. W 218
(1913).
1, Qunn v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 91 Wash. 542, 158 Pac. 82 (1916) Day
-v. St. Paul Fire & Marsne Ins. Co., 111 Wash. 49, 189 Pac. 95 (1920).
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dence such that reasonable minds might differ, the court has held
that the presence of the intent to deceive is a question of fact for
the jury to decide."6 However, in a number of cases, the court has
felt that the evidence was so clear that reasonable minds could not
differ and, using this presumption, has held as a matter of law
that the intent to deceive was present. The first of these eases was
that of Day vs. St. Paul & Marne Ins. Co.'7 Here the applicant rep-
resented that the car was a 1911 Winton touring car bought new
by him and costing $3,400. Actually it was a 1910 model which he
had bought second-hand for $2,000. The court said
"We have gone far in maintaining, as a question of fact,
the intent accompanying false and fraudulent representa-
tions, and have allowed to be submitted to the jury for its
determination the question of intent where there has been
very slight proof that the applicant for insurance might
have had no idea of procuring the policy by misrepresenta-
tions, but the rule should not be so far extended as to in-
clude a case such as this and allow insurance to be en-
forced which was not procurable had the truth been told,
where it was issued relying upon fraudulent statements
and the proof of honest intent consists merely in the appli-
cant's bare affirmation that his intent was honest. The
proof of the making of false and fraudulent representa-
tions raises a presumption of dishonest motive ,which must
be overcome by evidence establishing an honest motive
honesty and fair dealing would seem to require that, in
order to overcome the presumption, there must be some
testimony more concrete than was here given when an ap-
plicant admits, as he does here, that the representations
were made with the knowledge that they were untrue.""
Applicant had not stated the engine number correctly in his
application, although the court did not stress this point. In the
later case of Devenny vs. Auto. Owners Inter-Ins. Ass'n,9 where
applicant stated that a 1915 truck was a 1917 model, the court
did stress the fact that applicant correctly gave the factory and
engine numbers, from which the year could be ascertained, in
finding that the question of intent to deceive was one of fact for
the jury If the applicant places information in the insurance
company's hands from which the correct answer to the question
asked could be easily ascertained, the court thus considers it strong
evidence rebutting any intent to deceive.
In two other cases, the court has held that the evidence was so
"Brzghai v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., note 13, supra, Goertz v. Conti-
nental Life Ins. & Inv. Co., 95 Wash. 358, 163 Pac. 938 (1917) Askey U.
New York Life Ins. Co., note 13, supra.
"111 Wash. 49, 189 Pac. 95 (1920).
Id., p. 58-9.
"124 Wash. 453, 214 Pac. 833 (1923).
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clear that the question of intent to deceive was a question of law
In the one case"' it was shown that insured had been told by a
physician that she had a cancer and it was self-evident that she had
at least a tumor prior to the making of her application for life
insurance, but nevertheless stated in her application that she had
neither. The court said that there was a conclusive presumption
arising from the evidence that she had an intent to deceive. In
the other case21 insured had just been told by an eye specialist
that he was going blind, and nevertheless stated that he had no
eye trouble. These cases indicate that the court will make the
presumption conclusive only where the applicant knows the ques-
tion is important and knows the answer is false, that is, where the
jury would not be justified in finding otherwise.
In all of these cases the court is apparently requiring proof of
a subjective intent to deceive, a showing that in this case this
man must have intended to deceive. Houston vs. New York Life
Ins. Co.22 is an illustrative case. In this case, insured stated in the
application for reinstatement of a life insurance policy that within
the past twenty-four months he had made only one visit to a doc-
tor and that was six months before for grippe. As a matter of fact,
he had visited a physician about a month and a half before making
the application, and had been informed by the physician that he
had appendicitis and should have an operation. The operation
took place, successfully, a month after the application was made.
Insured died about a year later of heart disease. Although the
insured did consider the question asked broad enough to cover an
attack of a minor ailment such as the grippe about six months be-
fore, the court said that it was a question of fact for the jury to
determine whether in this case he had construed the question as
not covering temporary or minor ailments and whether he had
considered the possibility of an appendectomy such a minor ail-
ment that it was not intended to be covered by the question asked.
It should be noted that the court used language indicating that
there was doubt in its own mind whether this actually was a
material misstatement.
It frequently occurs that the insurance company's agent2 3 has
20 Walker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 132 Wash. 615, 232 Pac. 694
(1925).
21 Mututal Lsfe Ins. Co. of X. Y v. Campbell, 170 Wash. 485, 16 Pac. (2d)
836 (1932).
"159 Wash. 162, 292 Pac. 445 (1930), reported on second trial in 166
Wash. 611, 8 Pac. (2d) 434 (1932).
-" Under the insurance code, an agent of the insurer is one whom the
insurance company has appointed to solicit applications and effect insur-
ance for the company. Anyone else who solicits such applications is a
broker for whose acts and with whose knowledge the insurance company
is not chargeable. Rem. Rev Stat., sec. 7033; Reynolds v. Pacftic Maine
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affirmative knowledge that the statement made in the written
application is untrue. In such cases, both before and after the
passage of the statute, the Washington court has held that the
knowledge of the agent is the knowledge of the company and has
denied the company the use of these false statements as a defense.
24
The court has held that the insurance company is estopped by de-
livering the policy and accepting the premiums, saying that it will
not permit the insurance company to testify that it was commit-
ting a fraud upon the insured by accepting his money when it
knew that he had no right to the insurance.25 This result is quite
consistent with the result reached by the court in the tort cases
of deceit, where plaintiff is denied recovery unless he can show
that he was justified in relying on defendant's statements. 26 The
knowledge of the agent has also been used to show that the insured
actually had no intent to deceive in those cases in which the in-
sured told the agent the truth or in which the truth was self-
evident from the insured's physical condition, and yet the agent
wrote false answers in the application. 27 The court has thus per-
mitted the insured to rely on the agents of the insurance com-
pany and has held the insurance company responsible for their
careless or unscrupulous acts.
28
Finally, the court has held in certain cases that if the insurance
company or its agent fails to make inqiry as to the title of the
property insured and the applicant makes no representations with
regard thereto, the company waives the condition of unencumbered
title even though the condition is present in the insurance policy
Ins Co., 115 Wash. 629, 197 Pac. 913 (1921) Eaton v. National casualty
Ins. Co., note 17, supra.2
'Before statute: Mesterman v. Home Mutual Ins. Co., 5 Wash. 524, 32
Pac. 458 (1893) Foster v. Pioneer Mut. Ins. Co 37 Wash. 288, 79 Pac.
798 (1905) Staats v. PioneerIns. Ass'n, 55 Wash. 51, 104 Pac. 185 (1909)
Turner v. Amercan Casualty Co., 69 Wash. 154, 124 Pac. 486 (1912).
After statute: Brigham, v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. note 13, supra; Workman
v. Royal Exch. Assurance, note 12, supra, Robbzns v. Milwaukee Mechanics
Ins. Co., 102 Wash. 539, 173 Pac. 634 (1918) Stebbzns v. Westchester Fire
Ins. Co., 115 Wash. 629, 197 Pac. 913 (1921) Eaton v. National Casualty
Co., 122 Wash. 477, 210 Pac. 779 (1922) Small v. Standard Accident Ins.
Co., 144 Wash. 523, 258 Pac. 33 (1927) Tison v. American National Ins.
Co., first hearing, 163 Wash. 522, 1 Pac. (2d) 859 (1931).
I- Workz n v. Royal Exch.. Assurance, note 12, supra; Stebbins oV.
Westchester Fire Ins Co., note 24 suprai; Small v. Standard Accident Ins.
Co., note 24, supra.
2Zilke v. Woodley, 36 Wash. 84, 78 Pac. 299 (1904) Rhodes v. Owens,
101 Wash. 324, 172 Pac. 241 (1918) Fitch v. Miles, 133 Wash. 368, 233 Pac.
916 (1925) Sims v. Roblson, 142 Wash. 555, 253 Pac. 788 (1927).
"Eaton -v. National Casualty Co., note 24, supra, Tison v. American
National Ins. Co., note 24, supra.
"When the property insured is overvalued in the policy, there is a
presumption of fact that the agent knew the value, created by statute.
Rem. Rev. Stat., sec. 7150, 7151. But held that this does not prevent proof
of an intent to deceive by clear and convincing evidence. Myles v. North-
ern Assurance Co., 113 Wash. 158, 193 Pac. 703 (1920).
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itself.29 It is difficult to find that a man intended to deceive when
he didn't know that he was making a representation or warranty
A similar situation was presented in the case of Hayes vs. Auto-
mobile Ins. Exch" In this case insured signed a blank application
which insurer's agent filled out, having asked insured only how
much he paid for the car insured. The application, contained in
full in the policy,"1 thus embodied certain untrue statements to-
wit, that the car had not been in any prior wreck, that no other
company had cancelled or refused insurance on the car, and that
there existed no unmentioned incumbrance on the auto. The court
held that the insured could not contend that he had not read the
policy, saying that it was his duty to read it. As to the agent's
knowledge, the court said that the cases holding the insurance com-
pany liable where the agent has so acted do not go so far as to
relieve the insured when he has not acted in good faith. Reason-
ing thus, the court held for the insurance company The case
might be justified if the court found that insured knew that the
facts he was concealing were such that the insurance would not
have been granted to him if he had truthfully filled out the appli-
cation himself. Then it would be possible to find an intent to de-
ceive in signing the blank application. However, Judge Pemberton,
in the dissent, took the view that insured was ignorant of the
necessities of securing the insurance and thought no more was
necessary than was asked of him. He did answer the question
asked of him truthfully If the court took this view of the facts,
it is more difficult to follow the court's reasoning in finding an
intent to deceive. The majority of the court must have felt that
the insured evidently knew, from his previous experience with
insurance, of the questions which he should have been asked and
that they were material, hence he was properly chargeable with
an intent to deceive as a matter of law on the basis of the false
'Dooly v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co 16 Wash. 155, 47 Pac. 507 (1896)
Neher v. Western Assurance Co., 40 Wash. 157, 82 Pac. 166 (1905) Greger-
son v. Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 99 Wash. 639, 170 Pac. 331 (1918). Although
some of the statements made by the court have been general in termin-
ology, nevertheless the cases following this rule have all been cases In-
volving the condition of unencumbered title, a condition which is not very
material to the risk.
11 126 Wash. 487, 217 Pac. 252 (1923) on rehearing 129 Wash. 202, 224
Pac. 594 (1924).
3'The written application has been held inadmissable in evidence to
show misrepresentations inducing the policy where it is not attached to or
incorporated in the policy when the policy is issued, under Rem. Rev.
Stat., sec. 7075. Oral statements made at the time of the application to
the agent would apparently be admissible, however. Washtngton Fire
Relief Ass'n v. Albo, 130 Wash. 114, 226 Pac. 264 (1924) Bryan V. Fidelity
4& Casualty Co., 171 Wash. 457, 18 Pac. (2d) 482 (1933). Cf. Rem. Rev.
Stat., sec 7231 as to life insurance policies and Rem. Rev. Stat., sec. 7235
as to accident and health policies.
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statements in the policy The court said that although the answers
filled in by the agent were not representations made by insured,
the court would regard him as making those statements from the
time that he accepted the policy, charging him with a duty to read
the policy The court might, perhaps, have treated it as a case of
fraudulent concealment. Even so, because of the knowledge of the
insurer's agent it is still a difficult case to reconcile unless we also
say that the court must have felt the agent was so much a party
to the fraud that he could not be regarded as an agent of the
company m this transaction.
The court has relied on this Hayes case in its two most recent
decisions interpreting the statute. Both cases, that of Perrv vs.
Continental Ins. C0.32 and that of McCann vs. Reeder et al. &
Mercer Casualty Co.33 are based on reasoning that is somewhat
difficult to reconcile with the rules and principles above stated. In
the Perry case insured signed a written application already filled
out by insurer's agent on the basis of answers made to the ques-
tions by the insured. The court found that insured knew when
she signed the application that the agent had written that she had
had no previous fires. On the witness stand she offered testimony
that she had told the agent that she had had a previous fire for
which she had collected insurance. The court held that the pre-
sumption of intent to deceive was unrebutted, reversing as a mat-
ter of law the verdict of the jury for the plaintiff. In so holding,
the court said that insured was charged with having read the
policy and the application and thus with knowledge that the state-
ment with regard to the previous loss by fire was false. This exten-
sion of the Hayes case is doubtful. Its adoption seems inconsistent
with the rule that knowledge of the agent is the knowledge of the
company The court found that insured's testimony that she had
told the agent the truth did not even make the question of intent
to deceive one of fact since she knew that the statement as made
in the application was false, despite the fact that it is difficult to
conceive of insured's having a subjective intent to deceive when
she makes such a statement to insurer's agent. From the dicta in
this case it would appear that the applicant cannot even deny that
he made such false statements to the agent if they are in the appli-
cation, once he has accepted the policy The court charges the
insured with having read the policy and estops him on this basis.
This view of the court is less favorable to the insured than the view
2 78 Wash. Dec. 18, 33 Pac. (2d) 661 (1934), two judges dissenting.
3 78 Wash. Dec. 111, 34 Pac. (2d) 461 (1934), two judges dissenting.
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adopted prior to the enactment of Rem. Rev Stat., see. 7078. In
Turner vs. Amercan Casualty Co.3" the court said
91 this court has steadfastly held that a policy will
not be held void, nor will a warranty clause in a policy be
held to have been breached, for a cause known to the agent
before the application for the policy was signed, where
the insured fully and truthfully related the facts to the
solicitor, and false answers were written in the application
by him. (Cases cited.) The underlying principle of these
cases is that the knowledge of the agent is the knowledge
of the principal, without regard to whether the agent com-
municates the facts to it, that where the insured makes
full and truthful statements to the agent who procures
the policy of insurance, the insurer will be held to have
waived the written warranties in so far as they are not
in harmony with the facts disclosed "
Moreover the view adopted in the Perry case is difficult to recon-
cile with the ease which regards a failure to inquire as to title a
waiver of that condition in the policy 11
The Perry case also seems inconsistent with the decision in the
recent case of Bowden vs. General Ins. Co.36 in which the court
said
"True, the policy recites, as we have already noticed,
that Bowden purchased the automobile new in 1921, and
that it was a 1921 model. These, however, are but state-
ments by the insurance company in its policy, and even
these statements did not purport upon the face of the pol-
icy to have been made by Bowden. He did not notice these
incorrect statements in the policy We have seen that the
automobile was sufficiently described in the policy to
clearly identify it as the insured property Under the cir
cumstances, we do not think Bowden should be charged
with representing the facts as incorrectly stated in the
policy, as an inducement of the company to issue the
policy We conclude that the insurance company is not
absolved from the liability upon the ground of fraud on
the part of Bowden in inducing the issuance of the
policy "
In this case insured told the agent that he bought the car second-
hand in 1923, but the policy stated that he bought it new in 1921.
Yet the court affirmed the decision of the lower court for the
insured. The cases might be distinguished on the ground that
the insured in the Perry case knew that the agent was misstating
the answer in the application, whereas Bowden did not so know
But this distinction appears to be inadequate because in both cases
" Note 24, supra, at p. 160.
"5 Note 29, supra.
11152 Wash. 199, 203, 277 Pac. 443 (1929).
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the agent was told the truth and because in the Perry case the
court, in effect, said it would have charged the plaintiff with a
duty to read the application and so with knowledge if it had not
found that she actually knew, a statement which is equally appli-
cable to the Bowden case. Thus, in the case of Tison v. Amercan
National Ins. Co. the court said that the question of intent to de-
ceive was properly submitted to the jury where insured stated in
his application that his vision was not impaired, although he was
blind in one eye as was readily apparent to anyone who looked
at him, the court regarding the agent's necessarily acquired knowl-
edge of the defect as admissible evidence properly bearing on the
question of Tison's intent to deceive. Here insured himself made
the misstatement. The Perry case would also seem to disregard the
theory of estoppel on the basis of delivery of the policy and accept-
ance of premiums when the agent knows at the time of delivery
of facts which are contrary to the conditions stated in the policy 8
The other recent case, the McCann case, may perhaps be more
easily reconciled with the past decisions of the Washington court.
The conflict, if any, is one purely of policy as compared with that
expressed in the case of Houston v. New York Life Ins. Co.3 In
this case a clause in the policy warranted that the applicant (for
an automobile liability policy) had had no accidents within the past
three years as the result of the ownership or operation of an auto
vehicle. The evidence showed that within the three-year period
about fourteen accidents had occurred involving automobiles
which either insured or a corporation in which insured was a prin-
cipal stockholder owned or operated. Insured denied any intent
to deceive, testifying that he though the inquiry in the policy was
in regard to accidents in which insured had been at fault. In all of
these accidents no liability had been fastened on the insured or
his corporation. The decisions of the trial court for the plaintiff
was reversed, the appellate court finding an intent to deceive as
a matter of law The court seems to say that the number of
Reeder's accidents and the frequency thereof was such that Reeder
could not possibly omit reporting them without having an intent
to deceive. If such is the basis on which the court rests its
opinion, as it seems to be, there is no possible question as to the
holding of this case. In other places in the opinion, however, the
court seems to say that the question is one of construction of the
clause in the policy and the court would thus seem to be deciding
37 Note 34, supra.
Is Compare also Eaton v. National Camualty Co., note 24, supra, which
may be distinguished on the ground that the applicant thought the falsity
of the statement was Immaterial at the time he made it.
21 Note 22, supra.
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the construction placed on the policy by the insured as a matter
of law In so far as the court is doing this in arriving at its deci-
sion, the case seems to diverge from the policy expressed in the
Houston case of permitting the jury to decide as a question of
fact what the construction placed by the insured upon the ques-
tion in the insurance policy was.
It is submitted that these two most recent decisions of the
Washington Supreme Court represent a departure from the older
cases in that the court seems to be holding that an objective intent
to deceive is a sufficient basis for avoidance by the insurance com-
pany, rather than requiring proof of the subjective intent to de-
ceive as in the older cases. The court is throwing the responsi-
bility for the acts of careless or unscrupulous agents on the in-
sured rather than on the insurer as it formerly did. Such a hold-
ing tends to encourage unscrupulous agents and unscrupulous
insurance companies, a result which would seem undesirable. If
the insurer places great reliance on the statements made in the
application, it should be required to see that its agents correctly
explain the meaning of the questions and stress the importance
of giving correct answers to them. If there is any failure on the
part of the agent to do so, the insurer should be charged therewith.
The insurer is in a superior position to that of the insured since it
knows what information it wants, whereas the insured does not,
and since it is the insurer that selects the agent.40
0 For other notes on this same topic see Note, 6 Wash. L. Rev. 34
(1931) Note, 9 Wash. L. Rev 168 (1934).
